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Abstract
We study the optimal taxation of top labor incomes. Top income earners are modeled
as managers who operate a span of control technology as in Rosen (1982). Managers are
heterogeneous across talent, which is both effort-augmenting and total-factor-productivity
improving. The latter gives rise to a positive scale-of-operations effect. A tax formula for
optimal taxes is derived linking optimal marginal tax rates to preferences and technology
parameters. We show how to quantify the model using readily available ﬁrm-level data. Our
benchmark calibration focuses on the US. Our results suggest that optimal top taxes are
roughly in line with the current statutory rates and, thus, are signiﬁcantly lower than what
previous optimal taxation studies that ignore the scale-of-operations effect have shown.
Similar quantitative ﬁndings hold when we extend the analysis to a panel of developed
countries. (JEL D31, H21, H24, M12, M52)
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1 I N TRODUCT ION
Heightened concerns over recent trends in income inequality necessarily bring the taxation
of high earners to the forefront of the policy agenda.1 However, the vast literature in public
ﬁnance is far from reaching consensus on what the top income tax rate should be: While the
dominant view sets the optimal top tax rate above 70 percent, others have challenged the
validity of such elevated taxes on various grounds.2 This paper introduces a novel approach
to modeling and quantifying the behavior of highly talented individuals in the economy, thus
contributing to the aforementioned debate. Within top income earners, we focus on managers
and show how to exploit well-established facts on ﬁrm size and managerial compensation to
pin down the key forces shaping optimal income taxes. We ﬁnd that top income taxes at the
optimum are actually aligned with the current statutory rates in the US, unlike prevailing
recommendations in the literature.
Our approach is to take the standard optimal taxation environment and augment it with a
role for managers via a span of control technology. The economy is static, and it is populated by
workers and managers. We focus on the optimal tax treatment of the latter class of individuals,
motivated by the fact that a signiﬁcant fraction of top income earners fall within managerial
occupations in the data.3 Managers are heterogeneous across talent, which is privately
observed. A benevolent government values redistribution across types, but informational
frictions hinder full insurance. Building on the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971), optimal
tax functions are only restricted by such informational asymmetries.
The production process is modeled by extending the span of control technology in Rosen
(1982) to a framework with elastic labor supply. Speciﬁcally, managers operate separate
productive units, hire workers, and exert effort. The technology is such that managerial talent
has a dual role. First, it affects effort productivity, which captures the quality of supervision
or monitoring. Second, managerial ability affects the overall productivity of the ﬁrm. This
channel captures the quality of indivisible managerial decisions and creates a so-called scale-
of-operations effect.4 Crucially, this effect magniﬁes the impact of skill variations on ﬁrm
size and compensation differentials. In other words, for a given distribution of skills, a larger
scale-of-operations generates more right skewness in the distribution of ﬁrm sizes and pre-
tax income. Such a mapping from talent to observables has profound implications on our
1In the US, the share of income going to the top 1% increased from 9% in 1970 to 23.5% in 2007 (Diamond
and Saez (2011)). The top 1% accounted for 59.8% of average growth in income compared to just 9% of average
growth accounted for by the bottom 90% over this period (Piketty and Saez (2003)).
2Mankiw et al. (2009), for instance, cast doubt on the identiﬁcation of the ability distribution in Saez (2001),
while Mankiw (2013) discusses various normative judgements which can invalidate the standard optimal tax
formula used by Diamond and Saez (2011).
3Using tax return data, Bakija et al. (2012) document that executives, managers and supervisors account for
about 40% of the top 0.1% of income earners in recent years. When managers and professionals in the ﬁnancial
sector are included the number grows to 60%.
4See Mayer (1960). Rosen (1982) shows that a positive scale-of-operations effect is necessary to reconcile
stylized facts on managerial compensation.
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quantitative analysis, as we discuss below.
We show that the constrained efﬁcient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive
equilibrium with taxes levied on income and on ﬁrm size (measured as the size of the hired
workforce). The former tax is standard in the public ﬁnance literature, while the latter is not. A
positive marginal tax on ﬁrm size forces managers to operate below optimal scale.
We ﬁrst look at optimal income taxation and provide a formula for the optimal top marginal
tax rate. As it is standard, our tax formula links marginal rates to the assumed distribution of
talent, the redistributive motives of the policy maker, and the elasticity of labor supply of the
manager. In addition, a positive scale-of-operations affects the level of optimal taxes via two
channels: the ﬁrst one is explicit in the tax formula, while the second one is implicit. Explicitly,
the scale-of-operations impacts optimal taxes by shaping the relative productivity of skills and
effort (the two components of managerial input), and by modifying the sensitivity of such a
relationship to changes in labor supply. We show that the combined effect is positive when the
technology displays constant elasticity of substitution between managers’ and workers’ inputs.
In a nutshell, given a distribution of talent, larger values for the scale-of-operations generate
more skewness in pre-tax income. This creates a force for higher marginal taxes to level the
playing ﬁeld.5
The implicit effect arising from a positive scale-of-operations is connected to the shape of the
underlying density of managerial skills. More precisely, given a distribution of earnings or other
observables, the intrinsic distribution of skills becomes less skewed as the scale-of-operations
effect rises. This implies that any given dispersion of pre-tax income, for example, can now be
rationalized with a smaller dispersion in skills. In contrast with the explicit effect discussed
previously, this channel actually reduces optimal marginal taxes (all else equal). The logic is
now reversed: high-income managers operating large ﬁrms are not as high-talent as implied by
a model which ignores the scale-of-operations effect. Hence, those individuals should not be
subject to very high taxes, as implied by the textbook tax formula.
As anticipated above, our framework also provides normative grounds for the use of ﬁrm
size taxation. We ﬁnd that, in general, the government should forgo efﬁciency in the allocation
of labor in order to relax the incentive constraints of managers. A tax formula for optimal
marginal ﬁrm distortions is derived, through which we isolate sufﬁcient conditions on the
technology for marginal ﬁrm-size taxes to disappear. Such conditions are satisﬁed when the
scale-of-operations effect is shut down, or when the technology is Cobb-Douglas. In this sense,
our environment nests the well-known Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) efﬁciency result as a
special case. Moreover, we show that the sign of the optimal marginal ﬁrm-size tax depends on
the value of the elasticity of substitution in the production function.
5A rule of thumb for income tax design is that high marginal taxes are attractive when few individuals are
affected at the margin, but many individuals are taxed inframarginally (and, hence, without distortion). This
occurs, for instance, whenever the distribution of pre-tax income or the distribution of skills exhibits high levels
of right skewness (or “thick” right tails).
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We then take the model to the data to quantitatively evaluate the forces discussed above,
and to provide speciﬁc normative recommendations on top optimal marginal tax rates. To
determine tax rates, we require the identiﬁcation of two key objects: the parameter governing
the scale-of-operations effect and the distribution of managerial talent at the top. We identify
these parameters by following the insights from Rosen (1982). We start by deriving equilibrium
restrictions relating the distribution of talent with ﬁrm size, sales, and proﬁts. Using such
conditions, we ﬁrst show that the scale-of-operations effect can be written as a function of
the elasticity of ﬁrm size with respect to sales and the elasticity of managerial compensation
relative to sales, both of which can be backed out from the data. We pin down these elasticities
by using COMPUSTAT data and well-established regularities of managerial compensation.
The second object that requires to be calibrated is the distribution of talent at the top. This
is uncovered from the observed distribution of ﬁrm size and by exploiting the mapping between
talent and ﬁrm size predicted by our model. Notably, here we depart from the established
approach in public ﬁnance which instead recovers the ability distribution directly from the
distribution of income (see, e.g., Saez (2001)). Given that income data is usually conﬁdential
and top coded, we believe that the alternative route that we propose has certain advantages
when it comes to availability and reliability. We ﬁnd that, in the presence of a positive scale-
of-operations effect, the talent distribution is substantially more compact than in previous
studies: assuming that the right tail is Pareto distributed, our estimate on the tail parameter is
an order of magnitude larger than what was previously identiﬁed in the literature.
The optimal top tax rate in our benchmark calibration is 32.4 percent. This number is
signiﬁcantly lower than what is obtained in standard environments, such as Diamond and
Saez (2011), where top tax rates can be as high as 80 percent. Moreover, the top tax rate in
the US tax code falls within the range of estimates in our calibration.6 Our span of control
production function and the implied compactness in the upper tail of the skill distribution
are key in generating these results. For comparison, the optimal rate is equal to 65.4 percent
when using the same calibration but absent a scale-of-operations effect. We also extend the
analysis to a panel of developed countries, including Australia, Canada, and nine European
countries. We ﬁnd that benchmark optimal top tax rates are mostly concentrated within the
34-50 percent range and are strikingly similar across the nations in our sample.
RELATED L I TERATURE
This paper touches on two large literatures: the ﬁrst one concerns managerial compensation
and the second one deals with the taxation of top income earners.
A growing literature has modeled CEOs with heterogeneous talent that map into ﬁrm
6Saez et al. (2012) report a top 1% marginal rate of approximately 42.5% for 2009. Using the Current Popula-
tion Survey in the same period, we ﬁnd top marginal income tax rates of 33.5% at the federal level and 5% at the
state level. See Section 6 for details.
4
performance and managerial compensation schemes. Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) provide
early frameworks where the compensation of the CEO (the owner of the span of control
technology) can be analyzed jointly with ﬁrm size. Terviö (2008), Gabaix and Landier (2008),
and Edmans et al. (2009), on the other hand, consider models where ﬁrm size is ﬁxed
exogenously and the most productive managers are assigned to the largest ﬁrms.7 The key in
all of these models is that they introduce a nonlinear mapping between the compensation and
talent of the manager. In particular, the distribution of compensation is more positively skewed
than the distribution for talent, which is the key mechanism in our paper.8 Contributing to
this line of literature, we model the intensive margin of managerial effort. This is a necessary
step to think about top income taxation.
The literature on the optimal taxation of top income earners is vast.9 Methodologically, our
contribution with respect to this literature is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst paper that recovers the distribution of talent consistent with production functions
which are nonlinear in skills, and that studies the corresponding tax implications. Second,
our environment is one in which compensation of the agent (the manager in our case) is
endogenous. This is a departure from the classic taxation environment where wages are ﬁxed
exogenously. Stiglitz (1982) originally analyzes taxation under endogenous wages in a model
where workers of different types interact within an aggregate production function. As we clarify
below, though, the nature of wage endogeneity in our model is quite different from the one that
Stiglitz considers.10
Given that our approach is to map top income earners to managers, Rothschild and
Scheuer (2013) and Scheuer (2014) are also related to our work.11 These authors consider
an environment where agents are characterized by a multidimensional skill/taste vector and
decide whether to be a worker or a manager. These papers isolate a force for lowering top
taxes, like we do, but our mechanism is quite different from theirs. Speciﬁcally, in the spirit of
Stiglitz (1982), Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Scheuer (2014) obtain that reducing taxes
on individuals with high ability increases the productivity of lower types, therefore relaxing
7Other theoretical contributions in this area include Baker and Hall (2004), Edmans and Gabaix (2011),
Baranchuk et al. (2011), and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013). An incomplete list of empirical studies emphasiz-
ing the key role of CEO abilities include Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Adams et al. (2005), Bennedsen et al. (2007),
Kaplan et al. (2012), Custòdio and Metzger (2013), and Custòdio et al. (2013).
8This important feature also differentiates our paper from Baranchuk et al. (2011), who embed moral hazard
in a superstars model and derive implications on ﬁrm size and CEO compensation. Differently, we model explicitly
the managerial scale-of-operations effect. The skewness of ﬁrm size distribution endogenously generated in our
model is not only driven by the complementarity between talent and managerial effort (as in Baranchuk et al.
(2011)), but also from the complementarity between talent and span of control.
9For a review refer to Mankiw et al. (2009) and Diamond and Saez (2011).
10More recent work on taxation under endogenous wages include Slavík and Yazıcı (2014) and Ales et al. (2015).
The former focus on the endogenous accumulation of different forms of capital that interact differently with agents
of diverse talent, while the latter study the problem of assigning workers with heterogeneous talents to tasks with
heterogeneous complexity.
11The environment in this paper is static. For dynamic models that consider the modeling and taxation of
entrepreneurial wealth, refer to Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and Nardi (2006), Albanesi (2011), Shourideh (2012),
Brüggemann (2016).
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incentive constraints. In our framework, on the other hand, managerial effort has no effect on
other managers’ productivities as they operate separate ﬁrms.12 Instead, the main mechanism
which lowers top taxes in our paper is connected to the calibration of the skill distribution.13
Piketty et al. (2014) also considers a model of CEO taxation. In that paper, the CEO
can extract surplus by imposing a negative externality on workers, thus raising her own
compensation above her marginal product. This channel provides an upward pressure on
marginal tax rates, which corrects for the negative CEO externality. Differently from that work,
our model features no externalities.14 Instead, our approach to modeling managers is more in
line with the empirical evidence in Kaplan and Rauh (2013), who ﬁnd support for superstar
effects in the US using data on income and wealth at the top.
Finally, this paper is related to the contemporary works of Ales and Sleet (2016) and Scheuer
and Werning (2016). Both of these papers study an optimal managerial/superstar taxation
problem in competitive assignment environments. In these papers, top income earners of
heterogeneous abilities are matched to ﬁxed factors (ﬁrm assets), as in Terviö (2008) and
Gabaix and Landier (2008). In our paper, on the other hand, ﬁrm size is endogenous, and it is
affected by managerial ability as well as by the tax code. One way to interpret this difference is
to view Ales and Sleet (2016) and Scheuer and Werning (2016) as studying short-run taxation
implications where ﬁrm sizes do not adjust, while we provide a framework for the design of
taxation in the long run where ﬁrm size is allowed to vary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the environment.
In Section 3, we characterize efﬁciency. In Section 4, we look at the decentralization of the
optimum and derive the optimal tax formulas. In Section 5, we show our identiﬁcation strategy
and calibrate the model. In Section 6, we discuss the quantitative results on income taxes for
the US, and Section 7 computes income taxes across a panel of countries. Section 8 concludes.
The Appendix contains all proofs, robustness checks, and a numerical evaluation of ﬁrm size
distortions.
2 ENV I RONMENT
The economy is static, and it is populated by a unit measure of workers and a unit measure of
managers. There is a single consumption good. Managers have quasi-linear preferences over
12The effort of the manager does affect the productivity of the workers, but given that the latter are subject to a
different tax schedule, this has no impact on managerial incentives. See Section 6.1 for details.
13Golosov et al. (2016) and Huggett and Badel (2015) uncover different forces lowering optimal top tax rates in
dynamic models.
14For a general treatment of optimal taxation with positive or negative externalities, refer to Rothschild and
Scheuer (2016).
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consumption c and effort n, which are represented by the utility function
U(c, n) = c− v(n),
where v : R+ → R and is twice continuously differentiable with positive derivatives. Our
speciﬁcation for preferences abstracts from income effects.15
Workers have preferences over consumption and supply labor inelastically. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the disutility from effort of the worker to zero and the amount of
effective effort supplied to one. Consumption of the worker is denoted by cw ∈ R+.
Managers are heterogeneous with respect to managerial talent, denoted by θ ∈ Θ with
Θ =
[
θ, θ
] ⊂ R++. Managerial talent, θ, is distributed according to the cumulative distribution
function F : Θ → [0, 1] with density function f : Θ → R+. Following Rosen (1982) and Lucas
(1978), managers operate a span of control technology. Speciﬁcally, managers with talent θ
produce ﬁnal output y according to:
y
(
n,L, θ
)
= θγH (θn, L) , (1)
where L is hired labor and γ ≥ 0 is the scale-of-operations parameter (see below). The
production function H : R+ × R+ → R+ is concave, strictly increasing in both arguments, and
features continuous derivatives. We further assume that ynθ ≥ 0.
Managerial talent enters the production function (1) in two ways. First, θ is effort-
augmenting, as it multiplies n within H. Second, θ improves total factor productivity since
γ ≥ 0. We refer to the latter effect γ as the scale-of-operations effect, following Mayer (1960).16
This formulation is in line with the one in Rosen (1982), where managers’ actions naturally
affect the productivity of all workers under their supervision. But unlike the technology in
Rosen’s paper, we also incorporate elastic managerial effort n as an intensive margin.17
In what follows, it will be convenient to deﬁne n(y, L, θ) as the effort required by a manager
of talent θ to generate output y when hired labor is L. An allocation in this economy is then
deﬁned as (cw, c, y, L), where cw ∈ R+, c : Θ → R+, L : Θ → R+, y : Θ → [0, y¯], and 0 < y¯ < ∞. We
assume that c(θ), y(θ) and L(θ) are observable, while θ, n(θ) and θn(θ) are private information
to each θ-agent.
15Empirical analyses typically indicate that income effects are relatively small compared to substitution effects.
See, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Moreover, as argued by Diamond (1998), assuming small income effects
for very high income individuals appears suitable due to the presence of large estates.
16See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and references therein for additional details on the relationship between
managerial talent, ﬁrm size, and ﬁrm productivity.
17A model featuring capital (or any additional adjustable input) can be analyzed along the lines of Terviö (2008)
and Ales and Sleet (2016). In this case, the additional assumptions required are that the choice for capital be
undistorted neither by taxation nor by credit constraints.
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For a given level of (exogenous) government consumption G ≥ 0, an allocation is feasible if
cw +
∫
Θ
c(θ)dF (θ) +G ≤
∫
Θ
y(θ)dF (θ), (2)
and ∫
Θ
L(θ)dF (θ) ≤ 1. (3)
Social welfare is evaluated according to the social welfare function
SWF = Ψ(cw) +
∫
Θ
Ψ(c(θ)− v(n(y(θ), L(θ), θ))) dF (θ),
where Ψ : R→ R is a strictly increasing, differentiable and concave function which summarizes
social preferences for redistribution. In particular, we refer to Ψ′ (c(θ)− v(n(θ))) as the social
marginal welfare weight on managers of talent θ.
3 E FF I C I ENCY
In this section, we characterize efﬁcient allocations. We use a direct mechanism in which man-
agers report their talent θ to a social planner and are assigned an allocation for consumption
c(θ), output y(θ), and labor L(θ) accordingly. Deﬁne n(y(θ′), L(θ′), θ) as the level of effort exerted
by a manager of talent θ who mimics a manager of talent θ′. In this case, manager θ is assigned
L(θ′) workers and is required to produce output y(θ′). An allocation is incentive-compatible
when truthful revelation is optimal for all managers, which requires:
c(θ)− v(n(y(θ), L(θ), θ)) ≥ c(θ′)− v(n(y(θ′), L(θ′), θ)), ∀ θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. (4)
Efﬁcient allocations solve the following planning problem:
max
cw,{c(θ),y(θ),L(θ)}θ∈Θ
Ψ(cw) +
∫
Θ
Ψ(c(θ)− v(n(y(θ), L(θ), θ))) dF (θ), (PP)
s.t. (2), (3) and (4).
The next proposition provides a useful characterization of incentive compatibility with quasi-
linear utility.
Proposition 1. Let n(θ) ≡ n(y(θ), L(θ), θ), U(θ) ≡ c(θ)− v(n(θ)), and denote by ny, nL and nθ, the
ﬁrst derivatives of n(y, L, θ) with respect to its ﬁrst, second, and third arguments, respectively,
with similar notation for its second derivatives. Then incentive compatibility constraints (4) hold
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if and only if for all θ ∈ Θ:
U ′(θ) = −v′(n(y(θ), L(θ), θ))nθ(y(θ), L(θ), θ), (5)
and
v′′(n(θ))
v′(n(θ))2
c′(θ) +
nθy(θ)
nθ(θ)
y′(θ) +
nθL(θ)
nθ(θ)
L′(θ) ≥ 0. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
As it is standard in the optimal taxation literature, from here onwards we assume that the
monotonicity condition (6) is satisﬁed at the optimum.18 The condition holds, for example,
when c, y, and L are increasing in θ, and nθL is small enough. 19’20 In practice, we apply a ﬁrst
order approach to the planning problem, in which the original set of constraints (4) is replaced
by local ﬁrst order conditions. The relaxed version of the planner’s problem can be written as:
max
cw,{U(θ),y(θ),L(θ)}θ∈Θ
Ψ(cw) +
∫
Θ
Ψ(U(θ)) dF (θ), (PP-FOC)
s.t.
∫
Θ
[y(θ)− cw − U(θ)− v(n(y(θ), L(θ), θ))] dF (θ) = G, (7)
∫
Θ
L(θ)dF (θ) = 1, (8)
U ′(θ) = −v′(n(y(θ), L(θ), θ))nθ(y(θ), L(θ), θ), for all θ ∈ Θ. (9)
Before presenting the decentralization and showing the properties of the optimal tax system,
we discuss the incentive constraint (9) further. In the standard Mirrleesian environment,
output, talent, and effort are related through y(θ) = θn(θ), so that effort required to generate
output y is n(y, θ) = y/θ. In that case, the term nθ appearing on the right hand side of (9) is
given by nθ(y, θ) = −n(θ)/θ and, hence, the incentive constraint can be written only in terms
of the level of effort. In our environment, on the other hand, the incentive constraints will
generally incorporate labor as an additional margin for incentive provision. To be precise,
suppose (as in Rosen (1982)) that H satisﬁes constant returns to scale. Then by deﬁnition
18In our numerical simulations, we verify the validity of this assumption. See Scheuer (2014) for a recent
example of this approach. Kapicˇka (2013), Golosov et al. (2016), and Farhi and Werning (2013) apply similar
techniques in dynamic environments.
19It is straightforward to verify that nθ, nθy ≤ 0. The sign of nθL depends on the value of the elasticity of
substitution between n and L. In particular, when H displays constant returns to scale, nθL ≥ 0 as long as the
elasticity of substitution is greater than one.
20Relative to the standard Mirrleesian environment, where it is required that c and y be increasing in talent, (6)
also imposes a condition on the allocation of L.
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y = θγLh
(
θn(y,L,θ)
L
)
, where h(x) ≡ H(x, 1) for all x ≥ 0. Consequently, n(y, L, θ) = h−1 ( yθL) Lθ and
nθ(y, L, θ) = −h−1
( y
θγL
) L
θ2
− L
θ
1
h′
(
h−1
( y
θγL
)) y
L
γ
θγ+1
,
which simpliﬁes to
nθ(y, L, θ) = −n(θ)
θ
− γ
θ2
H(θn, L)
h′
(
θn
L
) . (10)
The ﬁrst term in (10) is the same expression which emerges in the standard Mirrleesian
environment discussed previously. Indeed, when γ = 0 the incentive constraint boils down
to the traditional formulation of Mirrlees. In contrast, the second term in (10) is novel to our
environment. Through this term, nθ and, hence, the right hand side of the incentive constraint
(9) will explicitly depend on L. This implies that by properly choosing labor, the social planner
may relax the incentive constraint. In the sections below, we show that the distorted choice of
L is implemented with a nonlinear tax on ﬁrm size, which is at the cost of production efﬁciency.
4 TAX IMPLEMENTAT ION
Next we construct a decentralization of the optimum in (PP) that relies on nonlinear taxes on
income (T ) and nonlinear taxes on ﬁrm size (TL). We then discuss certain properties of these
tax functions.
In the decentralized environment, managers of talent θ solve the following problem, taking
wages and tax rates as given:
max
c,y,L
c− v(n(y, L, θ)) (MP)
s.t. c ≤ y − wL− TL(wL)− T (y − wL− TL(wL)), (11)
where w ∈ R+ is the real wage, T : R+ → R is a nonlinear income tax, and TL : R+ → R is a
nonlinear tax on ﬁrm size.21 Since workers in our environment supply labor inelastically, their
problem is characterized by a simple budget constraint cw = w + φ, where φ is a government
transfer to the worker. We can now deﬁne a competitive equilibrium for our environment:
Deﬁnition 1. For a given level of government consumption G, a tax-distorted competitive equi-
librium is an allocation {c, y, L}, a tax system {T, TL, φ}, and a wage w such that:
1. Taking as given {w, T, TL}, each θ-manager solves (MP);
2. The worker’s budget constraint holds: cw = w + φ;
3. Goods and labor markets clear: equations (7) and (8) hold;
21The split between income tax and taxes depending on ﬁrm size is indeterminate. However, the split considered
in this paper is implementable with the information currently collected in the US from corporate and individual
income tax returns.
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4. The government’s budget constraint is balanced:∫
[T (y(θ)− wL(θ)− TL(wL(θ))) + TL(wL(θ))] dF (θ) = G+ φ. (12)
By applying a version of the taxation principle (see, e.g., Guesnerie (1981)), we derive the
following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let X ≡ {cw, (c(θ), y(θ), L(θ))θ∈Θ} be an optimal allocation solving (PP). Then
there exists a tax system {T, TL, φ} and a wage w such that X can be decentralized as a tax-
distorted competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
We refer to the tax system that implements the allocation X above as the optimal one. We
next proceed to characterize the optimal tax system.
4.1 I NCOME TAXAT ION
We begin by analyzing income taxation, which is the main focus of the paper. To facilitate
intuition, our optimal tax formulas will be written using derivatives of the production function
rather than derivatives of required effort n(y, L, θ) (e.g., we exploit that, for a given level of
output, ny = 1/yn). Assuming differentiability of T ′, ﬁrst order conditions from the manager’s
problem (MP) imply:
1− T ′(π(θ)) = v
′(n(θ))
yn(n(θ), L(θ), θ)
, (13)
where π(θ) ≡ y(θ) − wL(θ) − TL(wL(θ)) corresponds to income of a manager with talent θ and
n(θ) ≡ n(y(θ), L(θ), θ).
For the rest of the analysis, we make a standard assumption on preferences:
Assumption 1. The disutility for effort is isoelastic: v(n) = n1+
1
ε /(1 + 1ε ) with ε > 0.
The next proposition characterizes optimal marginal income tax rates. To simplify notation,
we refer to T ′(π(θ)) as T ′(θ), unless stated otherwise. Additionally, partial derivatives of the
production function given (n(θ), L(θ), θ) are denoted by yi(θ), for i = n,L, θ.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then at any solution to (PP-FOC), T ′(θ) satisﬁes:
T ′(θ)
1− T ′(θ) =
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
·
(
1− D(θ)
D(θ)
)
· yθ(θ)
yn(θ)
θ
n(θ)
·
⎡⎣1
ε
+
d ln
(
yθ(θ)
yn(θ)
)
d lnn(θ)
⎤⎦ , (14)
where
D(θ) ≡ 1
1− F (θ)
θ¯∫
θ
Ψ′ (U(θ)) dF (θ). (15)
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Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Equation (14) highlights the main forces that shape optimal marginal income tax rates in our
framework. The ﬁrst two terms are well known in the literature. The ﬁrst term looks at the
effect of the shape of the talent distribution on marginal tax rates. In particular, high marginal
taxes at talent level θ are attractive when the mass of managers above θ, given by (1− F (θ)), is
large. At the same time, the resulting distortion is proportional to the mass of individuals at θ
and to their productivity level, explaining the negative dependence on θf(θ). The second term
summarizes the redistributive tastes of the government. Unsurprisingly, optimal marginal
taxes on a given manager decrease as the corresponding social welfare weight rises.
The third term in the formula is novel and captures the relative contribution of the two
components of managerial input, i.e., skills and effort, into output. More precisely, (yθ/yn)(θ/n)
is the ratio between the output elasticity of talent and the output elasticity of effort. When
this term is large, high marginal taxes are warranted. The reason is that, in such a scenario,
the relative contribution of innate skills to income inequality is more pronounced than the
contribution of elastic effort. Consequently, redistributive taxes can level the playing ﬁeld
without triggering large efﬁciency costs.
The last term in square brackets represents the impact of effort responses on optimal tax
rates. The standard channel is encapsulated by the Frisch elasticity ε, which measures how
changes in after-tax compensation affect the supply of effort (holding the marginal utility of
wealth constant). A low Frisch elasticity translates into a small effort response to tax hikes,
which raises optimal marginal tax rates.
In addition to the conventional channel just described, effort variations also modify the
relative contribution of skills and effort into output and, hence, informational rents. Such an
effect is captured by the elasticity d ln (yθ/yn) /d lnn. Given that this coefﬁcient is positive,22
reductions in effort lower the relative productivity of talent. This latter lowers informational
rents, which increases the social surplus. In turn, a high value of the elasticity d ln (yθ/yn) /d lnn
provides a rationale for high tax rates since, all else equal, the resulting decrease in effort can
increase social welfare. To be more precise about this channel, note that, for a given θ, the
envelope condition (9) can be written as
U(θ) = U(θ) +
θ∫
θ
v′(n(θ˜))
yθ(θ˜)
yn(θ˜)
dθ˜, (16)
where we used nθ = −yθ/yn. This expression makes it clear that informational rents of the
managers, encapsulated in U(θ), decrease as yθ/yn falls (ceteris paribus).
Our tax formula nests traditional expressions for optimal income taxes in the literature. In
particular, suppose that γ = 0 so that y = H(θn, L). In that case, it is straightforward to show
22Recall that yθn ≥ 0 and ynn ≤ 0.
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that:
yθ(θ)
yn(θ)
θ
n(θ)
= 1, and
d ln
(
yθ(θ)
yn(θ)
)
d lnn(θ)
= 1.
Substituting into (14), we obtain the classic tax formula from Diamond (1998) or Saez (2001)
in terms of underlying structural parameters:
T ′(θ)
1− T ′(θ) =
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
(
1− D(θ)
D(θ)
)(
1
ε
+ 1
)
. (DS)
The next section untangles how a positive scale-of-operations parameter generates a departure
from the standard tax formula in (DS).
4.2 TOP I NCOME TAXAT ION UNDER CES TECHNOLOGY
Proposition 3 applies to quite general production functions H. To lay the groundwork for
our quantitative analysis, we make the following parametric assumption on the production
function:23
Assumption 2. The production function has constant elasticity of substitution:
y
(
n,L, θ
)
= θγ [β(θn)ρ + (1− β)Lρ] 1ρ ,
where β ∈ (0, 1), ρ ∈ [−∞, 1] and the elasticity of substitution between θn and L is given by
1
1−ρ ∈ [0,∞].
The following corollary characterizes optimal income taxes under Assumption 2.24,25
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then at any solution to (PP-FOC), T ′(θ) satis-
ﬁes:
T ′(θ)
1− T ′(θ) =
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
(
1− D(θ)
D(θ)
)(
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
yθ(θ)
yn(θ)
θ
n(θ)
[
1
ε
+
1 + γ1−κ(θ) (1− ρκ(θ))
1 + γ1−κ(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d ln
(
yθ(θ)
yn(θ)
)
/d lnn(θ)
]
, (17)
where κ(θ) ≡ yL(θ)L(θ)/y(θ) is the share of labor costs to total sales for managers of talent θ.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
23The estimation procedure described in Section 5 can be extended to other production functions as long as the
production function satisﬁes constant returns to scale.
24The case of a Cobb-Douglas production function (i.e., ρ = 0) reverts to equation (DS) after renormalizing skills
properly. We can also use the income distribution to recover a standard expression. This analysis is contained in
Section 6.1.
25Note that, under Assumption 2, we specialize the discussion to a constant return to scale production function.
Scheuer and Werning (2016) consider a related environment which does not impose constant returns to scale, but
which does not incorporate a scale-of-operations effect as considered in this paper.
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The Scale-of-Operations Effect The parameter γ impacts optimal tax rates via three chan-
nels. The ﬁrst two are explicit in formula (17), but the last one is not. We discuss each effect in
turn.
First, a larger γ leads to a larger output-talent elasticity relative to effort through (yθ/yn)(θ/n),
which translates into higher marginal taxes. Second, under the CES speciﬁcation, d ln (yθ/yn) /d lnn
decreases with γ. In other words, the relative weight of skills and effort into output becomes
less sensitive to changes in n as γ grows. The latter leads to lower marginal taxes, as discussed
in the previous section. Under CES technology, though, the ﬁrst effect dominates, which can
be veriﬁed by inspecting (17).
The third effect is implicit in the tax formula. In a nutshell, given a distribution of earnings
or other observables, the underlying distribution of skills becomes less “spread out” when γ
grows. This effect reduces optimal tax rates through the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of (17). While this channel will be analyzed in detail in Section 5 below, here we provide a
heuristic illustration.
Consider an observable variable z (such as income or ﬁrm size) which is monotonic in θ,
with distribution Fz and density F ′z = fz. By construction, f(θ) = fz(z)dz/dθ which implies
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
=
1− Fz(z)
zfz(z)
(
d ln z
d ln θ
)−1
, (18)
so that the left hand side, and hence optimal tax rates, are inversely related to the elasticity
of z with respect to θ. Crucially, in a decentralized environment, such an elasticity increases
with γ, which is the nature of superstar effects considered by Rosen. In that sense, a positive
scale-of-operations effect is consistent with a distribution for managerial ability which is more
compressed than what previous studies have considered.
Top Income Taxation To provide a benchmark for the optimal top income tax rate, we make
the following assumption:
Assumption 3.
(a) The talent distribution has a right Pareto tail with parameter a > 0:
lim
θ→θ¯
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
=
1
a
.
(b) There is zero social marginal welfare weight at the top: limθ→θ¯ D(θ) = 0.26
26By assuming zero social weight at the top, we implicitly focus on an upper bound for the optimal marginal
income tax at the top. This is clearly an extreme assumption, but still provides a benchmark that allows for
easy comparison with the bulk of the optimal taxation literature. More recently, Weinzierl (2014) looks at survey
evidence on preferred societal welfare criteria. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) derive tax formulas under arbitrary
marginal social weights.
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Let limθ→θ¯ κ(θ) = κ¯. Taking limits on (17) and using Assumption 3, we get an expression for the
optimal marginal tax rate at the top:
Corollary 2. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then the optimal marginal tax at the top
satisﬁes:
T ′(θ¯)
1− T ′(θ¯) =
1
a
(
1
ε
+ 1
)
+
1
a
γ
1− κ¯
(
1
ε
+ 1− ρκ¯
)
. (19)
Corollary 2 contains the main tax formula in our analysis. In the following sections, we
quantitatively evaluate the different effects shaping top tax rates in equation (19).
4.3 F I RM S I ZE TAXAT ION
While our main focus is on the shape of optimal income taxes, ﬁrm distortions are generally
necessary to implement the efﬁcient allocations, as implied by Proposition 2. We thus close
this section by characterizing optimal taxes on ﬁrm size TL.
Assuming differentiability of TL, ﬁrst order conditions from the manager’s problem (MP)
give:
1 + T ′L(wL(θ)) =
yL(n(θ), L(θ), θ)
w
, (20)
where yL is the marginal product of the worker.27
Equation (20) shows that if T ′L(wL(θ)) = 0 for some θ, the worker’s marginal product is not
equalized across ﬁrms. This implies a breakdown of the well-known Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) productive efﬁciency result. The reason behind the presence of labor misallocation at
the optimum was already discussed in Section 3: by affecting L, the social planner can relax
incentive constraints. The next proposition provides a formula for optimal ﬁrm size distortions.
We use T ′L(θ) instead of T
′
L(wL(θ)) to avoid clutter.
Proposition 4. At any solution of (PP-FOC), there exists a w such that T ′L(θ) satisﬁes:
T ′L(θ)
(1 + T ′L(θ))(1− T ′(θ))
=
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
·
(
1− D(θ)
D(θ)
)
· yθ(θ)
yL(θ)
θ
L(θ)
·
d ln
(
yθ(θ)
yn(θ)
)
d lnL(θ)
, (21)
where D(θ) is deﬁned by (15).
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
In the expression of Proposition 4, marginal ﬁrm size taxes T ′L are being normalized by
(1 + T ′L)(1− T ′), which is the after-tax cost of labor in wage units.28 The ﬁrst two terms on the
right hand side of (21) embed the effects of the talent distribution and of redistributive tastes
27Here we use that, for a given level of output, yL = −nL/ny.
28More precisely, each additional unit of labor employed carries a marginal tax of wT ′L. So after taxes, a manager
pays w(1 + T ′L)(1 − T ′) per unit of labor. The latter after-tax rate incorporates the factor (1 − T ′) since labor costs
are being deducted from taxable income in our decentralization (see (11)).
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on marginal taxes. Those coefﬁcients were also present in our income tax formula (14), and
the same intuition applies here. In contrast, the last two terms in (21) do deserve some further
explanation, to which we now turn.
The coefﬁcient (yθ/yL)(θ/L) is the ratio between the output elasticity of talent and the output
elasticity of labor input. A high value of this coefﬁcient implies that the relative contribution
of skills to output is high compared to the contribution of employed labor. In that case, ﬁrm
distortions affecting labor input decisions do not entail large efﬁciency costs, which permits the
planner using a high T ′L to provide incentives. Clearly, the ratio (yθ/yL)(θ/L) is the analogue of
(yθ/yn)(θ/n) showing up in the income tax formula (14).
The last term, d ln(yθ/yn)/d lnL, captures how variations in labor demand affect the infor-
mational rent of the managers. As discussed in Section 4.1, informational rents vary with
the size of yθ/yn across the skill distribution (see equation (16)). In the previous section, this
fact created a force for increasing marginal income tax rates, as captured by the elasticity
d ln(yθ/yn)/d lnn ≥ 0 in (14). The term d ln(yθ/yn)/d lnL has an analogous effect on T ′L. Speciﬁ-
cally, if that elasticity is positive (see below), introducing a positive marginal tax on ﬁrm size is
optimal, as the corresponding decrease in L lowers the informational rent of the managers (all
else equal). Essentially, in our model, informational rents change not only by affecting yθ/yn
via n (the standard channel in the literature), but also by changing L.
The elasticity d ln(yθ/yn)/d lnL is particularly important as it pins down the sign of T ′L.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to sign this coefﬁcient unless parametric assumptions are
made. The next corollary derives the expression of T ′L under the CES technology of Assumption
2 and shows that the sign of d ln(yθ/yn)/d lnL actually coincides with ρ.
Corollary 3. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, at any solution of (PP-FOC), there exists a w
such that T ′L(θ) satisﬁes:
T ′L(θ)
(1 + T ′L(θ))(1− T ′(θ))
=
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
(
1− D(θ)
D(θ)
)
γρ, (22)
where D(θ) is deﬁned by (15).
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
As evident from equation (22), ﬁrm size distortions vanish in the absence of a scale-of-operations
effect (γ = 0), or when working with a Cobb-Douglas production function (ρ = 0). Moreover,
equation (22) allows us to sign T ′L based on the value of the elasticity of substitution between
θn and L embedded in ρ. In particular, T ′L is strictly positive (negative) if ρ > 0 (< 0), i.e., if there
is high (low) substitutability between managerial effort and labor. Interestingly, this pattern
goes against the conventional inverse rule between taxes and elasticities.29
29In Appendix G, we quantify the optimal marginal tax on ﬁrm size T ′L within a numerical example.
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5 IDENT I F I CAT ION AND EST IMAT ION
The tax formula in (19), provides insights on the forces that shape top marginal tax rates. In
this section, we quantify these forces. Two parameters which are crucial for this quantita-
tive evaluation are the scale-of-operations parameter γ and the Pareto tail parameter of the
talent distribution a. Our main contribution in this section is to show how to estimate such
parameters using ﬁrm level data.
As a ﬁrst step, in Section 5.1 we derive equilibrium restrictions which relate the distribution
of talent with ﬁrm size, sales, and proﬁts. Those relationships are then used in Sections 5.2
and 5.3 to estimate γ and a, respectively. The ongoing assumption of this section is that ﬁrms
at the top are not subject to any size-dependent form of taxation.
5.1 F I RM LEVEL ELAST I C I T I E S
Our approach is along the lines of Rosen (1982). We make the following assumption that will
simplify the identiﬁcation of the key parameters of the paper:
Assumption 4. The production function H satisﬁes constant returns to scale.
Consider a competitive equilibrium where the manager faces a linear tax τ on her income,
pays wage w (taken as given) to each unit of labor input L, and gets a fraction χ ∈ (0, 1] of
total proﬁts.30 Due to the constant returns to scale assumption, we can write the θ-manager’s
problem as
max
{L,n,π}
(1− τ)χπ − v (n) (23)
s.t. π =
[
θγLh
(
θn
L
)
− wL
]
,
where h
(
θn
L
) ≡ H ( θnL , 1), h′ > 0, and h′′ < 0.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to L and n in (23) are given by:
θγ
[
h
(
θn
L
)
− θn
L
h′
(
θn
L
)]
= w, (24)
and
(1− τ)χθγ+1h′
(
θn
L
)
= v′ (n) . (25)
Equations (24) and (25) together imply the following lemma, where we show how ﬁrm size,
output, and proﬁts move together with respect to managerial talent.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Let {L(θ), n(θ), π(θ)} solve the θ-manager’s
problem in (23), and let σ be the elasticity of substitution between θn and L. Then the following
30The assumption that managers are subject to a constant marginal tax rate is motivated by the progressivity
of the US income tax system together with the fact that managers, in general, are located at the top of the income
distribution.
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relationships hold:
d lnL(θ)
d ln θ
= 1 +
γσ
1− κ(θ) + ε
(
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)
, (26)
d ln y(θ)
d ln θ
= 1 + γ + ε
(
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)
+
κ(θ)
1− κ(θ)γσ, (27)
d lnπ(θ)
d ln θ
=
(
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)
(1 + ε), (28)
where κ(θ) ≡ yL(θ)L(θ)/y(θ).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Lemma 1 reveals a key property of the scale-of-operations effect: for a given distribution of
talent, the distributions of ﬁrm size, sales, and proﬁts become more skewed as γ grows. In
particular, once we shut down the scale-of-operations effect (γ = 0), then the growth rates in
(26)-(28) are all equal to (1+ ε). However, L, y, and π respond more to differences in managerial
talent when γ is positive.31
It should be noted that the ownership share χ and the top marginal income tax rate τ do
not impact the elasticities in Lemma 1. Consequently, our estimation strategy in the following
section does not require information on χ and τ . A few assumptions underlying this feature are
key. First, χ and τ are constant across talent.32 Second, preferences are quasi-linear. Third,
the disutility for effort is isoelastic.
5.2 EST IMAT I NG THE SCALE -OF -OPERAT IONS EFFECT γ
Using the expressions in Lemma 1, we obtain the next proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then for any solution of the θ-manager’s
problem in (23) the following relationship holds:
γ =
1− d lnL(θ)d ln y(θ)
d lnL(θ)
d ln y(θ) − d lnπ(θ)d ln y(θ) σ+ε1+ε
. (29)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Equation (29) forms the basis for the estimation of γ. Speciﬁcally, to evaluate γ, we require
the elasticity of ﬁrm size with respect to sales (d lnL(θ)/d ln y(θ)), the elasticity of managerial
31This property is at the heart of Rosen’s analysis. In his own words: “This is what maintains the observed
long-tailed distribution of income at the top ranks: the distribution of rewards is more skewed than the distribution
of talent (...)” (Rosen (1982), page 317). In fact, it is straightforward to verify that if ε = 0, the relationships in
Lemma 1 map to equations (14)–(16) in his paper.
32If managers were subject to a nonlinear income tax schedule, the formulas in Lemma 1 would incorporate
terms with second derivatives of the tax function. However, the impact of those terms is negligible at the top, given
that the tax schedule is progressive but concave in US data. The widely used parameterization in Gouveia and
Strauss (1994), for example, has this implication. In fact, under that speciﬁcation, the marginal tax rate converges
to a constant.
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compensation with respect to sales (d lnπ(θ)/d ln y(θ)), the elasticity of substitution (σ), and the
Frisch elasticity (ε). Below we discuss how each of these are estimated.
Elasticity of ﬁrm size with respect to sales (d lnL/d ln y) To estimate this elasticity, we
consider the following linear relationship:
ln yt(θi) = α0 + α1 lnLt(θi) +
10∑
j=1
α2,jDivj + εi,t, (30)
where ln yt(θi) is the log of ﬁrm sales, lnLt(θi) is the log of ﬁrm size, and Divj are industry
division dummies.
We look at data from publicly traded US ﬁrms in COMPUSTAT. The sample is constructed at
an annual frequency from 2000 to 2012.33 Data on ﬁrm sales is taken from Gross Sales in the
Income Statement, and data on the total number of employees is taken from the Employees
item. Nominal variables are deﬂated using the CPI for all urban consumers, all goods. Division
dummies are based on Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) as deﬁned by the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration.34
Our employment data does not distinguish between managerial and non-managerial em-
ployees. To overcome this limitation, we assume that the number of top executives is ﬁxed
across ﬁrms. Also, we only consider ﬁrms above (and including) the median ﬁrm size for each
year, which minimizes the impact of assuming a ﬁxed number of top executives. To see this,
notice that for large ﬁrms the relationship between sales and non-managerial employees can
be approximated as follows:
ln(Salesi,t) = α0 + α1 ln
(
Employeesi,t − Number of top executivesi,t
)
= α0 + α1 ln
(
Employeesi,t
)
+ α1 ln
(
1− Number of top executivesi,t
Employeesi,t
)
≈ α0 + α1 ln
(
Employeesi,t
)
.
As a benchmark, we assume that the number of top executives is 20. From (30) we estimate
a value of α̂1 =
d ln y
d lnL = .951 (0.002), where
d ln y
d lnL denotes the average value of
d ln y(θ)
d lnL(θ) in our
sample. The estimated elasticity is consistent with the making-do-with-less effect which implies
a coefﬁcient smaller than one, as in Lazear et al. (2016).
In Table 1, we report details about our benchmark estimation (Column (1)) along with
additional robustness checks. Columns (2) − (4) look at the impact of extending the time
period and the effect of either industry or year dummies. Columns (5)− (6) look at the effect of
33From our sample we drop ﬁrms that report negative or zero sales and ﬁrms with duplicate CUSIP.
34Division refers to industry groupings. The 10 divisions considered are: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing;
Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services;
Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; Services; Public Administration.
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changing the decile of ﬁrm size included. We observe that our estimate, with either slightly
larger or smaller values, is robust to changes in speciﬁcation. Finally, in Figure 1, we also
report our estimates when changing the number of top executives from 1 to 50. The ﬁgure
also includes the comparison between our benchmark estimation and the case in which ﬁrms
below the median size are included.
Table 1: Estimating the Elasticity of Firm Size With Respect to Sales
ln(Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Workers) 0.951 0.933 0.956 0.968 0.912 0.972
[0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [.0008] [0.004]
Year dummy Yes Yes
Division dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All time period Yes Yes Yes
Deciles Included ≥ 5 ≥ 5 ≥ 5 ≥ 5 All ≥ 8
Observations 50,267 50,267 171,044 171,044 265,764 25,131
R2 0.77 0.71 0.79 0.80 0.84 0.69
Notes: Estimates of elasticity of sales with respect to workers (α1) in (30). Column (1) displays bench-
mark calculation using COMPUSTAT data (2000-2012). “Year dummy” denotes the inclusion or not of
yearly dummies. “Division dummy” highlights the inclusion or not in (30) of dummies based on Stan-
dard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) from Occupational Safety & Health Administration. “All time pe-
riod” denotes the usage of the entire dataset up to 1950. ”Decile Included” denotes the sample of ﬁrms
by size included in the estimation of α1. We report standard errors in square parentheses.
Elasticity of managerial compensation with respect to sales (d lnπ/d ln y) Starting from
Roberts (1956), there is a vast literature estimating the elasticity of managerial compensation
with respect to ﬁrm size in the cross-section.35 This literature has highlighted an empirical
regularity, usually denoted as “Roberts’s Law,” which states that, on average, managerial com-
pensation is a power law of ﬁrm size. When proxying ﬁrm size using sales, the corresponding
exponent is estimated at around 1/3, so in our benchmark calculation we set d lnπd ln y = 1/3.
36
Frisch elasticity (ε) and elasticity of substitution (σ) We set the value of ε based on
previous studies. Speciﬁcally, following the guidelines of Chetty et al. (2011), we set ε equal to
0.5 for our benchmark calibration.37 As for the elasticity of substitution σ, we assume it is
35See also Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Baker et al. (1988), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Frydman and Saks
(2010), or Alder (2016).
36 Baker, Jensen and Murphy state that “The best documented empirical regularity regarding levels of executive
compensation is an elasticity of compensation with respect to ﬁrm sales of about 0.3 (...).” (Baker et al. (1988), page
609).
37There exists an extensive literature devoted to the estimation of the elasticity of labor supply. For prime age
males, MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) estimate an elasticity between 0 to 0.54. Saez (2003), using the NBER
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Figure 1: Estimates of elasticity of sales with respect to workers ( d ln yd lnL ) by
number of top executives. “Benchmark” refers to estimates of (30) using
ﬁrms above the median size. “All Sample” refers to estimates of (30) also
including ﬁrms below the median ﬁrm size.
constant (as in the case with CES technology) and rely on equilibrium modeling restrictions
to pin down this parameter. Given the values for the elasticities d lnπ/d ln y and d ln y/d lnL
estimated previously, equation (29) does not return a positive value of γ for every possible
combination of ε and σ. Indeed, using ε = 0.5, we have that γ ≥ 0 if and only if σ ≥ 4.25. Based
on this threshold, we set σ = 5 (ρ = 4/5) in the benchmark calibration and perform a robustness
check on this parameter in Section 6. Other values of ε would yield a different feasible range
for σ, as it is shown in Figure 2. Overall, from Figure 2, we see that the feasible range for σ
precludes a Cobb-Douglas production function (σ = 1) for empirically relevant values of ε.
We can now determine γ using equation (29) in Proposition 5. We get:
γ =
1− 10.951
1
0.951 − 0.34× 0.5+50.5+1
= 0.30.
Next we discuss the estimation of the Pareto parameter a for the distribution of managerial
talent.
5.3 EST IMAT I NG THE TA I L OF THE TALENT D I S TR I BUT ION a
In this subsection, we show how to recover the shape of the tail of the talent distribution
using the distribution of ﬁrm sizes. This approach differs from the standard approach of
estimating such a parameter based on the observed distribution of incomes (which is discussed
tax panel from 1979 to 1981, estimates a labor elasticity of 0.25. Similar ranges are estimated by Blundell et al.
(2016) and French (2005). Chetty et al. (2011) ﬁnd values equal to 0.5 on the intensive margin and 0.25 on the
extensive margin.
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Figure 2: Region for the elasticity of substitution (σ) and Frisch elasticity (ε)
consistent with a positive scale-of-operations parameter (γ).
in Appendix E for robustness purposes). The main advantage of our approach is that ﬁrm
level data is readily available and comprehensive. This is a striking difference with respect to
income data, which in many instances is survey-based and top-coded.
We start by deriving a relationship between the tail of the talent distribution and the tail
of the ﬁrm size distribution. Given Assumption 3, the maximum likelihood estimate of a
satisﬁes:38
1
aˆ
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ln(θi)− ln(θ)) , (31)
where {θ1, . . . , θN} is a given a realization of managerial talent, and θ is the minimum possible
value of θ. If we let aL denote the tail parameter of the Pareto distribution of ﬁrm size, the
analogue to (31) yields:
1
aˆL
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ln(L(θi))− ln(L(θ))) . (32)
From equation (26) in Lemma 1, we have that:
ln(L(θ))− ln(L(θ)) =
(
1 +
γσ
1− κ(θ) + ε
(
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
))
(ln(θ)− ln(θ)) . (33)
Finally, combining (31)-(33) and taking limits, we can link the tail parameters on the talent
and ﬁrm size distributions as follows:39
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then for any solution of the θ-manager’s
problem in (23) we have:
a =
(
1 +
γσ
1− κ¯ + ε
(
1 +
γ
1− κ¯
))
× aL. (34)
38See, e.g., Malik (1970).
39We assume that regularity conditions necessary for consistency of maximum likelihood estimates hold.
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Using equation (34) and the parameters of Section 5.2, the Pareto tail parameter a can be
inferred from the observed value for aL, and the share of labor costs at the top κ¯. We pin down
these parameters as follows. First, it is well documented that the distribution of ﬁrm size
exhibits a Pareto distribution with tail parameter close to one. Taking the estimate from Axtell
(2001), we set aL = 1.06. Second, combining equations (26)-(28) from Lemma 1, we obtain:40
1− κ(θ) =
1− d lnL(θ)d ln y(θ)
d lnπ(θ)
d ln y(θ) − d lnL(θ)d ln y(θ)
. (35)
Our approach is to use the estimated elasticities d lnL/d ln y and d lnπ/d ln y into (35) to approx-
imate κ¯. We get κ¯ ≈ 0.93.41
Plugging in our estimates into equation (34), we obtain
a =
(
1 +
0.30× 5
1− 0.93 + 0.5×
(
1 +
0.30
1− 0.93
))
× 1.06 ≈ 26.13.
The above analysis shows that the distribution of talent is signiﬁcantly less skewed than the
distribution of ﬁrm size: a is an order of magnitude larger than aL.42 Fundamentally, this big
difference relies on a positive scale-of-operations effect γ.
To conclude this section, Table 2 summarizes the benchmark parameters and moments used
in the calibration. We next compute the value for optimal taxes at the top.
6 OPT IMAL TOP I NCOME TAXAT ION IN THE US
Substituting the parameters of the benchmark calibration from Table 2 into our top tax formula
(19), we obtain the optimal tax rate implied by our environment:
T ′(θ¯) =
1
1 + a
[
1
ε + 1 +
γ
1−κ¯
(
1
ε + 1− ρκ¯
)]−1 = 32.4%.
The prescribed value for top marginal rates relies crucially on the estimated value of γ and
its inﬂuence on a. To see this, it is instructive to compare the result with the case in which
the scale-of-operations effect is shut down: by imposing γ = 0, we obtain aγ=0 = 1.59, and the
corresponding tax rate is almost double our benchmark at 65.4 percent. (For comparison,
40See equation (C.10) in Appendix C.2.
41This estimate provides an opportunity for a testable implication. In COMPUSTAT, we consider the top quintile
ﬁrms in terms of employment size. For these ﬁrms we observe an average work force of 20, 000 individuals. This
implies that the pay ratio of top executives over an average worker (i.e., the ratio of the compensation of a top
executive over that of an average worker in the same ﬁrm) is roughly 0.08
20
/ 0.93
20,000
≈ 86.2. To determine an empirical
counterpart, we take the CEO-to-worker pay ratio among the 100 highest-grossing publicly traded companies
in the United States from PAYSCALE (see www.payscale.com/data-packages/ceo-income/full-list). The average
across these top ﬁrms is 87.4, which closely matches what the estimated κ implies.
42The same conclusion holds when calibrating a using the income distribution, as discussed in Appendix E.
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Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Calibration.
Parameter Symbol Value
Scale-of-operations parameter γ 0.30
Pareto tail parameter of the talent distribution a 26.13
Frisch elasticity ε 0.5
Elasticity of substitution σ 5
Elasticity of ﬁrm size w.r.t. sales d lnLd ln y 1.051
Elasticity of executive compensation w.r.t. sales d lnπd ln y 0.34
Share of labor costs to total sales at the top κ¯ 0.93
Notes: The elasticity of substitution (σ) and Frisch elasticity (ε) are imposed
exogenously. Firm elasticities are estimated from the data as described in
Section 5.2. γ, a, and κ are computed using (29), (34), and (35), respectively.
Diamond and Saez (2011) use a value of a = 1.5.)
We next proceed to study the effect of the elasticity of labor supply (ε) and the degree of
substitutability across inputs (σ) on the optimal top marginal tax rates. These are reported in
Table 3. As expected, we observe that tax rates are decreasing in ε. To evaluate the impact of
σ, we use two values. The ﬁst one (σ = 4.5) is close to the lower bound consistent with γ ≥ 0 in
the benchmark calibration. The second value (σ = 10) is an arbitrarily large number. We see
that marginal tax rates are increasing in σ, but optimal tax rates are relatively insensitive to
variations in this parameter. It is worth noting that whenever we change ε or γ, we recompute
γ and a using (29) and (34), respectively.
The table also shows marginal taxes when imposing γ = 0. Compared to our benchmark
results, marginal taxes are higher, but the difference between the two (in relative terms) is
decreasing as labor supply becomes more inelastic. Figure 3 displays the previous observations
for wider ranges of ε and σ.
To conclude, it is useful to compare the baseline optimal tax rate of 32.4 percent with
what we see in US data. The empirical top tax rate is recovered as follows. We look at the
March edition of the CPS from 2000 to 2010. For every individual in our sample, we compute
federal and state taxes of labor income using the NBER TAXSIM calculator.43 For the top 99th
percentile, we ﬁnd an effective marginal federal tax rate of 33.5 percent and a marginal state
tax rate of 5 percent. Saez et al. (2012) report a marginal rate of approximately 50 percent for
the top 1 percent of workers post 2000. With these values in mind, our benchmark prescribes
a tax rate in line with what we currently observe in US data.
43We drop individuals with negative income and labor income below $100. Also dropped are individuals for
which labor income is less than 60% of total income or more than 120% of total income. Tax rates are computed
using the NBER TAXSIM calculator version 9.2. Rates reported are applied to the head of household inclusive of
transfer received. Refer to Ales et al. (2015) for further details.
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Table 3: Top Marginal Tax Rates.
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.50
σ 4.5 10 4.5 10
T ′(θ¯) 51.5% 53.2% 31.7% 34.9%
γ 0.24 0.03 0.87 0.04
a 18.1 5.9 65.5 7.8
T ′γ=0(θ¯) 79.1% 65.3%
aγ=0 1.3 1.6
Notes: T ′(θ¯) denotes optimal tax rate as imputed
by (19). The values for the scale-of-operations pa-
rameter (γ) and the Pareto tail parameter of the
talent distribution (a) are computed using (29)
and (34), respectively. T ′γ=0(θ¯) denotes the opti-
mal tax rates with the exogenous constraint of
γ = 0.
6.1 CONNECT IONS TO PREV IOUS STUD IES
Relationship with Saez (2001) In Section 4, we showed how the classic (DS) tax formula
is recovered in the case with γ = 0. That formula was expressed in terms of primitives of the
environment, namely the distribution of managerial talent and the structural parameters of
the production function. We now relate our formula to an alternative expression in Saez (2001)
which utililizes the income distribution instead of the distribution of skills.
In our environment, for a given value of a we can recover the tail parameter for the
distribution of income, aπ, by applying the following identity (see Appendix E for a derivation):
a =
(
1 +
γ
1− κ¯
)
(1 + ε)aπ. (36)
We can next substitute this value in our previous tax formula (19) to get:
T ′(θ¯) =
1
1 + aπε
(
1 + γ1−κ¯
) [
1 + γ1−κ¯
(
1− ρκ¯ε1+ε
)]−1 . (37)
As discussed in Diamond and Saez (2011), marginal taxes at the top can be written in terms of
the tail parameter of the distribution of income aπ, and the income elasticity of the after tax
rate e ≡ ∂ log π(θ)∂ log(1−τ) . In our environment we are unable to provide such a characterization. The
reason is that our measure of e depends on the curvature of ﬁrm size taxes (i.e., T ′′L), which
cannot be pinned down analytically.44 Nonetheless, equation (37) shows that we can still write
our top tax formula in terms of ε, which is the elasticity of taxable income in the absence
44Appendix G numerically characterizes the progressivity of ﬁrm size taxes within some calibrated examples.
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics of Optimal Top Tax Rates.
of ﬁrm size taxes (see Appendix D). This equation also allows us to provide an immediate
connection with the literature. In particular, with no scale-of-operations effect (γ = 0), or in
the Cobb-Douglas case (ρ = 0), equation (37) simpliﬁes to T ′ = 1/(1 + aπε). This is the same
formulation presented in Saez (2001), and it is consistent with Corollary 3 and the fact either
of these cases lead to zero ﬁrm size taxes. For all other cases with γ > 0 and ρ > 0, we can
think of the term
(
1 + γ1−κ¯
) [
1 + γ1−κ¯
(
1− ρκ¯ε1+ε
)]−1
in (37) as providing an (upward) adjustment to
the income elasticity of the after tax rate when ﬁrm distortions are zero. We refer the reader to
Scheuer and Werning (2016) for an analysis on how various elasticity measures need to be
adjusted in a related environment with superstar effects.
Remark 1. The standard approach in public ﬁnance to the issue of optimal top income taxation
relies on estimating the elasticity of taxable income in reduced form (see, for example Saez et al.
(2012) and Piketty et al. (2014)). Our approach, on the other hand, recognizes that this elasticity
is endogenous to policy, and that ﬁrm level distortions may have a particularly strong effect.
Absent ﬁrm size distortions, the value of the elasticity of taxable income is given by the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. This would be a case in which the value of “e” generated by the model
would be consistent with the one estimated from the data.
Relationship with Stiglitz (1982) Stiglitz (1982) shows that the presence of endogenous
wages provides a rationale for lowering top income tax rates. The logic is the following.
Suppose that labor supplies of individuals with different skills are complements into the
production function. Under this scenario, reducing marginal taxes on individuals with high
ability induces them to increase their labor supply and, thus, increases the productivity of
individuals with lower ability. The latter reduces wage disparities across skills, which relaxes
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incentive constraints. This insight has been recently extended to richer assignment models
(see, e.g, Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Ales et al. (2015)).
While our quantitative results also imply lower top tax rates than in environments with
exogenous wages, it is important to note that we abstract from Stiglitz-type effects both within
and across occupations. First of all, effort decisions of any given manager have no impact on
other managers’ wages. The reason is that managers of different abilities are perfect substitutes
into the aggregate production function (which is the sum of ﬁrms’ outputs). Second, while
an increment in managerial effort does increase the productivity of the workers, the resulting
reduction in wage dispersion across occupations does not relax incentive constraints of the
manager. This is because occupations in our model are perfectly observable. Indeed, a crucial
assumption in Stiglitz (1982) is that the government uses a single tax schedule on different
types of labor (this is relaxed in Scheuer (2014), who analyzes both cases in an entrepreneurial
model with endogenous entry). Our environment, on the other hand, features differential tax
treatment of managers and workers.
7 CROSS -COUNTR Y RESUL TS
A contribution of this paper is to make operational the study of optimal top income tax rates by
using ﬁrm-level data. This is appealing since, in most countries, this data is publicly available
given the regulatory requirements on publicly traded ﬁrms. For example, COMPUSTAT GLOBAL
contains detailed fundamental data for major companies trading on international exchanges
dating back to 1987. In addition, ORBIS, the multi-country database published by Bureau
van Dijk, covers information (including sales) on more than 50 million companies world-wide.
Moreover, compensation data across countries for individual top executives can be obtained
from BoardEx, which is compiled by the UK-based ﬁrm Management Diagnostics Limited.
Next, we calculate optimal top income tax for a panel of eleven non-US countries with
mandated disclosure of executive compensation, including nine European countries (Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), Australia, and
Canada.45 For this purpose, we take the estimates of ﬁrm sales Pareto tail parameters from
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) who estimate the country-by-country power laws using
ﬁrm-level sales from ORBIS. The ﬁrm size Pareto tail parameter is then obtained by aL =
d ln y
d lnLay.
The estimates of CEO pay-sales elasticities d lnπd ln y are taken from Fernandes et al. (2013), whose
sample is restricted to countries having mandated disclosure of executive compensation.
The sales-size elasticity d ln yd lnL is estimated using the same methodology in Section 5.2 based
on COMPUSTAT NORTH AMERICA for Canada and COMPUSTAT GLOBAL for the other non-US
countries.
45We thank Miguel Ferreira for sharing the estimates of CEO pay-sales elasticities in the thirteen non-US
countries with mandated disclosure of executive compensation. Norway and South Africa are excluded from the
sample: Norway has low BoardEx coverage resulting in a negative Roberts’ law estimate, while South Africa has
low ORBIS coverage.
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Table 4: Top Tax Rates Across Countries
Country aL d lnπd ln y
d ln y
d lnL γ a T
′
(θ¯) T
′
γ=0(θ¯) T
′
Data
Australia 0.97 0.41 0.98 0.04 8.34 0.41 0.67 0.49
Belgium 0.89 0.37 0.92 0.34 14.84 0.39 0.69 0.45
Canada 0.80 0.38 0.90 0.38 12.61 0.42 0.71 0.50
France 0.79 0.42 0.89 0.31 8.88 0.45 0.72 0.54
Germany 0.79 0.39 0.93 0.21 9.39 0.44 0.72 0.48
Ireland 0.75 0.38 0.99 0.02 7.64 0.46 0.73 0.47
Italy 0.82 0.52 0.80 0.38 6.22 0.48 0.71 0.49
Netherlands 0.86 0.30 0.95 1.00 74.50 0.34 0.70 0.49
Sweden 0.82 0.31 0.92 1.26 53.94 0.36 0.71 0.57
Switzerland 0.77 0.60 0.97 0.02 2.69 0.59 0.72 0.36
UK 0.97 0.42 0.96 0.09 8.08 0.42 0.67 0.45
US 1.06 0.33 0.95 0.30 26.13 0.32 0.65 0.46
Notes: For all the non-US countries, we obtain aL, d lnπd ln y , and
d ln y
d lnL
according to the following procedure. The ﬁrm
size Pareto tail parameter aL is estimated from aL = d ln yd lnLay. The estimates of ﬁrm sales Pareto tail parameter ay
are taken from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) based on ORBIS database. The estimates of CEO pay-sales
elasticities d lnπ
d ln y
are taken from Fernandes et al. (2013). The sales-size elasticity d ln y
d lnL
is estimated using the same
methodology described in Section 5.2 for 2000-2012. The data for Canada is from COMPUSTAT NORTH AMERICA,
whereas those for all the other non-US countries are from COMPUSTAT GLOBAL. T
′
Data denotes the top statutory
personal income tax rate. It is take from the OECD Taxing Wages Database Table I.7.
In Table 4, we present the estimates for aL, d lnπd ln y , and
d ln y
d lnL , along with the implied values for
γ, a, and optimal top tax rates with and without the scale-of-operations effect. The results for
the US are displayed at the bottom of the table for comparison. Figure 4 displays the scatter
plots by country of the optimal top income tax rates versus log(a+ 1) and log(γ + 1).
Our ﬁndings on the optimal top income tax rates are strikingly robust across countries.
For all the non-US countries, the estimated scale-of-operations effect γ is positive, and the
estimated distribution of talent is signiﬁcantly less skewed than ﬁrm size. Consequently, the
optimal tax rates are lower once we consider the scale-of-operations effect relative to the case
without it (compare T ′(θ¯) vs. T ′γ=0(θ¯)). Most of the differences in top tax rates across countries
are explained by variations in the ﬁrm size tail index (Column 1) and in the pay-size elasticity
(Column 2). The US, the Netherlands, and Sweden have high values of γ and a and hence are
at the bottom of the marginal tax rate. In comparison, Switzerland and Italy have low values
of a, thereby standing at the top of the spectrum. Comparing the patterns in scatter plots
4(a) and 4(b), model implied optimal top tax rates vary more signiﬁcantly with a than γ. This
conﬁrms that the effect from a more compressed managerial talent distribution dominates
in lowering top tax rates. Finally, in the last column, Table 4 contains actual top statutory
personal income tax rates taken from OECD data. When comparing optimal taxes to their
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Figure 4: Optimal Top Tax Rates by Country.
statutory counterparts, those rates are generally much closer to each other in our framework
than in the case with γ = 0 (Sweden is the exception due to the combination of two factors: a
high value of a and a high statutory rate.)
8 CONCLUS ION
The title of this paper is a reference to the thought-provoking novel of Rand (1957).46 In
this dystopian novel, top income earners have a vital role in the workings of the economy
and threaten to stop the “world’s motor” in response to increasing government regulation.
In this paper, we aim to quantify the scope of such types of actions in an optimal taxation
framework. Within top income earners, we focus on managers whose effort talent, and hired
labor jointly contribute to generate output. We quantify the forces shaping optimal tax rates by
estimating the distribution of talent at the top and the impact of managers on the ﬁrm’s overall
productivity (here referred to as the scale-of-operations effect).
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we ﬁnd that top tax rates should be
substantially lower than what previous recommendations ignoring the scale-of-operations effect
have found. The second contribution is methodological, as we show how to exploit ﬁrm level
data (as opposed to surveys or censuses eliciting workers’ income) to pin down key parameters
relevant for income taxation. Lastly, we provide normative grounds for implementing ﬁrm-size
taxes.
Our theoretical results extend to all income earners who have a control over hired inputs
46The excellent survey of Slemrod (2000) also features a similar title.
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that enter in the production (e.g., top lawyers, medical doctors, etc.). Nevertheless, an open
question is to quantitatively evaluate the way in which top earners other than managers
generate income and how they respond to changes in marginal tax rates. The logical next step
involves taking a closer look at the role of managers in the production process. Two extensions
come to mind. The ﬁrst one is to analyze optimal taxes in richer hierarchical organizations,
rather than in two-rank ﬁrms. An important second extension is to consider a dynamic model
of CEOs. Such a model would allow us to analyze the optimal taxation of different forms of
CEO compensation (long and short term), as well as the interaction between the tax code,
managerial compensation, and turnover.
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APPEND IX
A PROOF OF PROPOS I T ION 1
Deﬁne M(θ′, θ) ≡ c(θ′)− v(n(y(θ′), L(θ′), θ)). Incentive compatibility (4) requires that for all θ ∈ Θ,
M(θ′, θ) attains a global maximum at θ′ = θ. We start by characterizing local maxima of M(θ′, θ)
at θ′ = θ using the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let M(θ′, θ) ≡ c(θ′) − v(n(θ′, θ)) where n(θ′, θ) ≡ n(y(θ′), L(θ′), θ). A local maximum of
M(θ′, θ) at θ′ = θ is attained if and only if for all θ ∈ Θ:
c′(θ)− v′(n(θ)) [ny(θ)y′(θ) + nL(θ)L′(θ)] = 0, (A.1)
and
y′(θ)
[
v′′(n(θ))ny(θ)nθ(θ) + v′(n(θ))nθy(θ)
]
+
+L′(θ)
[
v′′(n(θ))nL(θ)nθ(θ) + v′(n(θ))nθL(θ)
] ≤ 0, (A.2)
where n(θ, θ) = n(θ) and ni(θ, θ) = ni(θ) for i = y, L, θ, θy, θL.
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition for θ′ = θ to be a local maximum of M(θ′, θ) is M1(θ, θ) = 0.47
This is equivalent to (A.1). Differentiating the ﬁrst order condition M1(θ, θ) = 0 with respect
to θ gives M11(θ) +M12(θ) = 0. Hence, the second order condition M11(θ) ≤ 0 can be written as
−M12(θ) ≤ 0, which gives (A.2).
We now go back to the proof of Proposition 1, which shows that M(θ′, θ) attains a global
maximum at θ′ = θ when (A.1) and (A.2) hold. The proof follows standard arguments.
Proof. We want to show that M1(θ′, θ) has the sign of (θ − θ′). First note that
M1(θ
′, θ) = c′(θ′)− v′(n(θ′, θ)) [ny(θ′, θ)y′(θ′) + nL(θ′, θ)L′(θ′)] . (A.3)
We also have that (A.1) evaluated at θ′ gives
c′(θ′) = v′(n(θ′))
[
ny(θ
′)y′(θ′) + nL(θ′)L′(θ′)
]
. (A.4)
Using (A.4) into (A.3) gives
M1(θ
′, θ) = J(θ′, θ′)− J(θ′, θ), (A.5)
where J(θ′, θ) ≡ v′(n(θ′, θ)) [ny(θ′, θ)y′(θ′) + nL(θ′, θ)L′(θ′)]. Differentiating with respect to the
second argument:
J2(θ
′, θ′) = y′(θ′)
[
v′′(n(θ′))ny(θ′)nθ(θ′) + v′(n(θ′))nθy(θ′)
]
+
L′(θ′)
[
v′′(n(θ′))nL(θ′)nθ(θ′) + v′(n(θ′))nθL(θ′)
]
;
From (A.2) we have that J2(θ′, θ′) ≤ 0. Then (A.5) implies that M1(θ′, θ) ≥ 0 if and only if θ′ ≤ θ.
Equation (5) follows from (A.1), and (6) is obtained by combining (A.1) and (A.2). This completes
the proof.
47The subscript i = 1, 2 denotes derivative with respect to the ﬁrst or second argument.
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B PROOFS OF SECT ION 4
B.1 PROOF OF PROPOS I T ION 2
As a ﬁrst step, we show that there exist a wage w and a tax system {T, TL, φ} such that for a
given θ ∈ Θ, the optimal allocation {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} solves the manager’s problem in (MP). To
that end, deﬁne the retention function
R(y, L) ≡ max
c
{
c : c(θ)− v(n(y(θ), L(θ), θ)) ≥ c− v(n(y, L, θ)), ∀θ ∈ Θ
}
, (B.1)
and the budget set
B ≡
{
(c, y, L) : c ≤ R(y, L)
}
.
Now consider the following claim:
Claim 1. Take a θ ∈ Θ and let {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} be the optimal allocation assigned to the θ-
manager. Then {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} solves the problem:
{c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} ∈ arg max
{c,y,L}∈B
c− v(n(y, L, θ)). (B.2)
Proof. To prove this claim, we follow two steps: (1) show that {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} ∈ B, for all θ,
and (2) show that for each θ, {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} solves (B.2). Step (1) follows by contradiction.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that there exists a θˆ such that {c(θˆ), y(θˆ), L(θˆ)} /∈ B. Then, by construction,
it must be that
c(θˆ) > R(y(θˆ), L(θˆ))
≥ max
c
{
c : c(θ′)− v(n(y(θ′), L(θ′), θ′)) ≥ c− v(n(y(θˆ), L(θˆ), θ′))
}
for some θ′ ∈ Θ, implying that
c(θˆ)− v(n(y(θˆ), L(θˆ), θ′)) > c(θ′)− v(n(y(θ′), L(θ′), θ′)),
which violates incentive compatibility. Given that {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} ∈ B, for all θ, Step (2) is
immediate by incentive compatibility.
Now deﬁne taxes T , TL, and a wage w such that:
y − wL− TL(wL)− T (y − wL− TL(wL)) = R(y, L), (B.3)
where R(y, L) is the retention function deﬁned in (B.1).
Clearly, many different tax-wage combinations satisfy the relationship in (B.3).48 Claim
1 then implies that for each of those combinations, {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} solves the θ-manager’s
problem in (MP).
To complete the proof of the decentralization, deﬁne the transfer φ ≡ cw − w, where cw is the
consumption of the worker at the optimum. Given this level φ, the worker’s budget constraint
holds with equality at the optimal allocation. The optimum also satisﬁes market clearing
conditions by construction, while the government’s budget is balanced by Walras’ law.
48For this reason, the levels of T , TL and w are not determined in the decentralization.
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B.2 PROOF OF PROPOS I T ION 3
We compute efﬁcient allocations by solving the optimal control problem (PP-FOC) where y(θ) and
L(θ) are the controls and U(θ) is the state variable. After integrating by parts, the Lagrangian
to the planner’s problem is (suppressing dependencies with respect to θ, y and L):
L = Ψ(cw) +
∫
Ψ(U)dF −
∫
[μ′U − μv′(n)nθ]dθ + λr
∫
[y − cw − U − v(n)]dF − λl
∫
[L− 1]dF,
where λr is the multiplier on (7), λl is the multiplier on (8) and μ(θ) is the costate on (9) that
also satisﬁes the boundary conditions μ(θ) = limθ→θ μ(θ) = 0. It is straightforward to show that
all of these multipliers are positive.
Optimality conditions with respect to the controls y and L are, respectively,
λr(1− v′(n)ny)f + μ(v′′(n)nynθ + v′nθy) = 0, (B.4)
−λlf − λrv′(n)nLf + μ(v′′(n)nLnθ + v′nθL) = 0, (B.5)
and the costate equation is
μ′ = (Ψ′(U)− λr)f. (B.6)
Integrating (B.6) between θ and θ and using the transversality condition, we get
μ(θ) =
θ∫
θ
(
λr −Ψ′(U(θ˜))
)
f(θ˜)dθ˜. (B.7)
Evaluating (B.7) at θ gives
λr =
∫
Θ
Ψ′(U(θ˜))f(θ˜)dθ˜. (B.8)
Let D(θ) ≡ 11−F (θ)
∫ θ¯
θ Ψ
′(U(θ˜))dF (θ˜) so that D(θ) = λr. Substituting into (B.7), we obtain
μ(θ) = (1− F (θ)) (D(θ)−D(θ)) . (B.9)
From (B.4)
−μnyv′
[
v′′
v′
nθ +
nθy
ny
]
= λr[1− v′(n)ny]f.
Substituting (B.9) into the above yields
(1− F (θ)) (D(θ)−D(θ))nyv′
[
−v
′′
v′
nθ − nθy
ny
]
= λr[1− v′(n)ny]f.
By Assumption 1 and (B.8), we get
(1− F (θ))
θf(θ)
(
1− D(θ)
D(θ)
)[
−1
ε
nθ
n
θ − nθy
ny
θ
]
=
[1− v′(n)ny]
v′(n)ny
,
so using (13) yields
T ′
1− T ′ =
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
(
1− D(θ)
D(θ)
)[
−1
ε
nθ
n
θ − nθy
ny
θ
]
. (B.10)
Next, we write the partial derivatives of n in (B.10) in terms of partial derivatives of y. Consider
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the identity y(n(y¯, L, θ), L, θ) = y¯. Differentiation yields:
ny =
1
yn
, (B.11)
nL = −yL
yn
, (B.12)
and
nθ = − yθ
yn
. (B.13)
By differentiating both sides of (B.11) with respect to θ, we have nθy = −ynnnθ+ynθy2n , which implies
−nθy
ny
θ =
(
ynn
yn
n
)(nθ
n
θ
)
+
ynθ
yn
θ
=
[
ynθ
yθ
n− ynn
yn
n
]
yθ
yn
θ
n
=
d ln
(
yθ
yn
)
d lnn
yθ
yn
θ
n
. (B.14)
Substituting (B.13) and (B.14) into (B.10) gives the result.
B.3 PROOF OF COROLLAR Y 1
Denote with g(θ) = θγ. Given Assumption 2, we have
n(y, L, θ) =
[
1
β
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
− 1− β
β
(
L
θ
)ρ] 1ρ
. (B.15)
Taking derivatives from (B.15), we obtain
nθ(y, L, θ) =
(
−1
θ
)[
1
β
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
− 1− β
β
(
L
θ
)ρ] 1ρ−1 [ 1
β
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ)− 1− β
β
(
L
θ
)ρ]
,
using the above and (B.15), we get
nθ(y, L, θ)
n(y, L, θ)
= −1
θ
(
y
g(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ)− (1− β)Lρ(
y
g(θ)
)ρ − (1− β)Lρ . (B.16)
Also
ny(y, L, θ) =
[
1
β
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
− 1− β
β
(
L
θ
)ρ] 1ρ−1 1
βy
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
, (B.17)
nθy(y, L, θ) =
(
−1− ρ
θ
)
1
βy
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ [
1
β
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
− 1− β
β
(
L
θ
)ρ] 1ρ−2
×[
1
β
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ)− 1− β
β
(
L
θ
)ρ]
− ρ
θ
[
1
β
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
− 1− β
β
(
L
θ
)ρ] 1ρ−1 1
βy
(
y
θg(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ).
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The two equations above imply:
nθy(y, L, θ)
ny(y, L, θ)
= −1
θ
⎡⎣(1− ρ)
(
y
g(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ)− (1− β)Lρ(
y
g(θ)
)ρ − (1− β)Lρ + ρ(1 + γ)
⎤⎦ . (B.18)
By Assumption 2, we have (
y(θ)
g(θ)
)ρ
= β(θn)ρ + (1− β)Lρ.
Then (
y
g(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ)− (1− β)Lρ(
y
g(θ)
)ρ − (1− β)Lρ = 1 + γ
(
1 +
1− β
β
(
L
θn
)ρ)
. (B.19)
Also, Assumption 2 implies:
κ(θ)
1− κ(θ) =
1− β
β
(
L
θn
)ρ
, (B.20)
where κ(θ) ≡ yL(θ)L(θ)/y(θ) denotes the share of labor costs to total sales for manager θ.
Using (B.20) in (B.19) gives(
y
g(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ)− (1− β)Lρ(
y
g(θ)
)ρ − (1− β)Lρ = 1 + γ
(
1 +
κ(θ)
1− κ(θ)
)
. (B.21)
Combining (B.13) with (B.16) and (B.21) gives the expression for yθyn
θ
n :
yθ
yn
θ
n
= −nθ
n
θ = 1 +
γ
1− κ(θ) . (B.22)
As for the expression for
d ln
(
yθ
yn
)
d lnn , note that (B.14) implies
d ln
(
yθ
yn
)
d lnn
= −nθy
ny
θ
(
−nθ
n
θ
)−1
=
[
(1− ρ)
(
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)
+ ρ(1 + γ)
](
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)−1
=
[
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)(1− ρκ(θ))
](
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)−1
, (B.23)
where the next to last line follows from (B.18), (B.21), and (B.22). This completes the proof.
B.4 PROOF OF PROPOS I T ION 4
Combining (B.4) and (B.5) gives:
−nL
ny
=
λlf − μv′nθL
λrf + μv′nθy
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Using that yL = −nL/ny49 and applying the manager’s ﬁrst order condition (20) yields:
w(1 + T ′L) =
λlf − μv′nθL
λrf + μv′nθy
. (B.24)
Consider an implementation in which w = λl/λr.50 In that case,
1 + T ′L =
1− 1w μλrf v′nθL
1 + μλrf v
′nθy
,
so that (
1 +
μ
λrf
nθy
ny
v′ny
)
T ′L = −
μ
λrf
(
nθL
1
wny
+
nθy
ny
)
v′ny. (B.25)
By the ﬁrst order conditions (13) and (20), it follows that
v′ny = 1− T ′, and 1
wny
= −1 + T
′
L
nL
, (B.26)
where we used that yL = −nL/ny.
Substituting (B.26) into (B.25) produces(
1 +
μ
λrf
nθy
ny
(1− T ′)
)
T ′L = −
μ
λrf
(
−nθL
nL
(1− T ′L) +
nθy
ny
)
(1− T ′).
This expression can be rearranged as
T ′L
(1 + T ′L)(1− T ′)
=
μ
λrθf
[
nθL
nL
θ − nθy
ny
θ
]
. (B.27)
We now operate on the square brackets of the right hand side. Using (B.12) we get
nθL
nL
θ =
(
yθ
yL
θ
L
)(
yθL
yθ
L− ynL
yn
L
)
−
(
yθ
yn
θ
n
)(
yθn
yθ
n− ynn
yn
n
)
=
(
yθ
yL
θ
L
)(
yθL
yθ
L− ynL
yn
L
)
+
nθy
ny
θ, (B.28)
where the last equality follows from (B.14).
Plugging in (B.28) into (B.27) gives
T ′L
(1 + T ′L)(1− T ′)
=
μ
λrθf
(
yθ
yL
θ
L
)[
yθL
yθ
L− ynL
yn
L
]
=
μ
λrθf
(
yθ
yL
θ
L
) d ln( yθyn)
d lnL
. (B.29)
Finally, substituting μλrθf =
1−F
θf
(
1− DD
)
, as per Proposition 3, proves the result.
49See (B.11) and (B.12).
50By Proposition 2, it is always possible to construct such an implementation, as long as the tax system
{T, TL, φ} satisﬁes (B.3) and φ = cw − w.
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B.5 PROOF OF COROLLAR Y 3
The proof goes along the lines of the proof of Corollary 1. In particular, by Assumption 2, it
follows that
nθL
nL
θ = −(1− ρ)
(
y
g(θ)
)ρ
(1 + γ)− (1− β)Lρ(
y
g(θ)
)ρ − (1− β)Lρ − ρ,
where g(θ) = θγ. By (B.21):
nθL
nL
θ = −(1− ρ)
(
1 + γ
(
1 +
κ(θ)
1− κ(θ)
))
− ρ
= −1− (1− ρ) γ
1− κ(θ) . (B.30)
On the other hand, from the proof of Corollary 1, we know that
− nθy
ny
θ = 1 + (1− ρκ(θ)) γ
1− κ(θ) . (B.31)
Combining (B.30) and (B.30)
nθL
nL
θ − nθy
ny
θ = γρ.
The result then follows by substituting this expression and μλrθf =
1−F
θf
(
1− DD
)
into (B.27).
C PROOFS OF SECT ION 5
C.1 PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We start by establishing the following result (henceforth we suppress the arguments of all
functions):
Lemma 3. Denote the elasticity of substitution between θn and L with σ ≡ − d ln(L/θn)d ln(f2/f1) . We have:
1
σ
= −
(
θn
L
)
h′′
h′
1
κ
. (C.1)
Proof. From the deﬁnition of κ, we can write
1− κ = θn
L
h′
h
. (C.2)
Let f (θn, L) = Lh (θn/L). Denote the elasticity of substitution between θn and L with σ ≡
− d ln(L/θn)d ln(f2/f1) . By deﬁnition of f , we have f1 = h′ and f2 = h − θnL h′, which implies
f2
f1
= hh′ − θnL .
Therefore
1
σ
= −d ln (f2/f1)
d ln (L/θn)
= −
(
h
h′
− θn
L
)−1 L
θn
d
(
h
h′ − θnL
)
d (L/θn)
.
Differentiating and re-arranging, we get:
1
σ
= −
(
θn
L
)
h′′
h′
(
1− θn
L
h′
h
)−1
.
Substituting (C.2) in the above, we obtain the result.
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We now move to the proof of Lemma 1. For notational convenience, let g = θγ and g′ = γθγ−1.
Proof. We begin by determining the relationship between the manager labor supply decision
and his type. Differentiating (24) and (25) with respect to θ we get, respectively,
d lnL
d ln θ
− d lnn
d ln θ
= 1− θg
′
g
(
L
θn
)2 1
h′′
(
h− θn
L
h′
)
, (C.3)
and
nθ
L
gh′′
d lnL
d ln θ
+
[
n
θ
v′′
(1− τ)χ −
θn
L
gh′′
]
d lnn
d ln θ
= g′θh′ + gh′ + gh′′
nθ
L
. (C.4)
Combining (C.3) and (C.4), it follows that
n
θ
v′′
(1− τ)χ
d lnn
d ln θ
+
nθ
L
gh′′
(
1 +
γσ
1− κ
)
= g′θh′ + gh′ + gh′′
nθ
L
,
where we applied (C.1), (C.2), and the deﬁnition of g. Further rearranging and using (C.1) gives:
v′′
(1− τ)χ
n
θ
d lnn
d ln θ
= gh′
(
1 +
γ
1− κ
)
. (C.5)
Finally, substituting the ﬁrst order condition (25), we have
d lnn
d ln θ
= ε
(
1 +
γ
1− κ
)
, (C.6)
where we used that v
′
v′′n = ε. Plugging in (C.6) into (C.3),
d lnL
d ln θ
= ε
(
1 +
γ
1− κ
)
+ 1− γ
(
L
θn
)2 1
h′′
(
h− θn
L
h′
)
.
then applying (C.1) and (C.2) and rearranging gives (26).
Now we obtain equation (27). By constant returns to scale, we can write y = gLh, so that
d ln y
d ln θ
=
d ln g (θ)
d ln θ
+
d lnL
d ln θ
+
d lnh
d ln θ
= γ +
d lnL
d ln θ
+
θn
L
h′
h
(
1 +
d lnn
d ln θ
− d lnL
d ln θ
)
.
Substituting (C.2) in the above gives
d ln y
d ln θ
= γ + κ
d lnL
d ln θ
+ (1− κ)
(
1 +
d lnn
d ln θ
)
.
So substituting (26) and (C.6) into the above expression gives (27).
Finally, we derive equation (28). Proﬁts are given by π = y − wL. Then
d lnπ
d ln θ
=
y
π
d ln y
d ln θ
− wL
π
d lnL
d ln θ
,
or
d lnπ
d ln θ
=
1
1− κ
d ln y
d ln θ
− κ
1− κ
d lnL
d ln θ
, (C.7)
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where we used that wL/y = yLL/y = κ. Substituting (26) and (27) into (C.7) and rearranging
gives (28).
C.2 PROOF OF PROPOS I T ION 5
Proof. The following relationships are derived by combining (26)-(28):
d lnL(θ)
d ln y(θ)
=
(1− κ(θ))(1 + ε) + γ(σ + ε)
(1− κ(θ))(1 + γ + ε) + γ(κ(θ)σ + ε) , (C.8)
d lnπ(θ)
d ln y(θ)
=
(1− κ(θ) + γ) (1 + ε)
(1− κ(θ))(1 + γ + ε) + γ(κ(θ)σ + ε) . (C.9)
From (C.8) and (C.9), we obtain
1− κ(θ) =
1− d lnL(θ)d ln y(θ)
d lnπ(θ)
d ln y(θ) − d lnL(θ)d ln y(θ)
. (C.10)
Also, by rearranging equation (C.8), we have
γ =
(
1− d lnL(θ)d ln y(θ)
)
(1− κ(θ))(1 + ε)
d lnL(θ)
d ln y(θ) (1− κ(θ) + κ(θ)σ + ε)− (σ + ε)
. (C.11)
Substituting (C.10) into equation (C.11) gives equation (29).
D F I RM D I S TOR T IONS AND TAX ELAST I C I T I E S
In this appendix we show that in the absence of ﬁrm distortions, the elasticity of taxable
income of the manager equals the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ε.
We ﬁrst show that, at the optimum, it is possible to write the income of managers of talent θ
as π(θ) = ω(θ, w)n where ω(θ, w) is the wage of managers of talent θ exercising effort n. The ﬁrst
order condition with respect to L is: θγH2(θn, L) = w. Since H2 is a homogeneous of degree zero
function, we have θγH2(θn/L, 1) = w so that θnL = H
−1
2
(
w
θγ , 1
)
. This relationship implies that for a
given θ and w, the relationship between θn and L is linear. Deﬁne m(θ, w) = 1/H−12
(
w
θγ , 1
)
so that
L = m(θ, w)θn. Substituting in the expression for proﬁts, we have: π(θ, n) = θγH(θn,m(θ, w)θn)−
m(θ, w)wθn. Since H is homogeneous of degree one, we have:
π(θ, n) =
[
θγ+1H(1,m(θ, w))− wm(θ, w)θ
]
n = ω(θ, w)n.
We can now write the problem of the θ-manager as:
max
c,n
c− v(n) s.t. c = (1− τ)ω(θ, w)n.
First order conditions of the above problem can be written as n(θ) = (v′)−1[(1 − τ)ω(θ, w)], so
that:
∂n(θ)
∂(1− τ) =
1
v′′(n(θ))
· ω(θ, w) = v
′(n(θ))
v′′(n(θ))
· 1
(1− τ) , (D.1)
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where the second equality follows from the ﬁrst order condition. Substituting (D.1):
e ≡ ∂ logω(θ, w)n(θ)
∂ log(1− τ) =
∂n(θ)
∂(1− τ) ·
1− τ
n(θ)
= ε.
This analysis would not apply in the case of a ﬁrm being subject to arbitrary taxes on ﬁrm size,
or if the size of the ﬁrm is ﬁxed.
E US I NG THE D I S TR I BUT ION OF INCOME TO CALCULATE a
In Subsection 5.3, we estimated a using the distribution of ﬁrm sizes. In this section, we
proceed similarly but focusing on the distribution of income instead. From equation (28) in
Lemma 1, we have that
lnπ(θ) =
(
1 +
γ
1− κ(θ)
)
(1 + ε) ln θ.
Approximating κ(θ) = κ¯ and substituting in (31), we get
1
a
=
1(
1 + γ1−κ¯
)
(1 + ε)
1
N
N∑
i=1
lnπ(θi).
Assume that in the data income is distributed according to a Pareto distribution with tail
parameter aπ. We then have 1aπ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 lnπ(θ
i). Substituting in the above, we get:
a =
(
1 +
γ
1− κ¯
)
(1 + ε)aπ.
F ADD I T IONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this appendix, we expand on the results of Section 6 by providing additional robustness
checks. We perform sensitivity analyses with respect to two empirical moments: the elasticity
of ﬁrm size with respect to sales d lnL(θ)/d ln y(θ) and the Pareto tail parameter of the ﬁrm size
distribution aL. These moments affect the calibration of the parameters a, γ and κ.
To make the relationship between the top tax formula and d lnL(θ)/d ln y(θ) and aL more
transparent, we rewrite (19) by substituting the formula for κ in (C.10), γ in (29), and a in (34).
We get:
T ′(π∗(θ¯)) =
1
1 + aL
d lnL(θ¯)
d ln y(θ¯)
d lnπ(θ¯)
d ln y(θ¯) (
1
σ
+ 1
ε )− 1σ
. (F.1)
In Table 5, we compute the top marginal tax rate over a range of aL and
d lnL(θ¯)
d ln y(θ¯)
.
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Table 5: Top Tax Rate: Robustness.
aL = 0.8 aL = 1.5
d lnL(θ¯)
d ln y(θ¯)
1.18 0.95 1.18 0.95
T ′(θ¯) 36.8% 41.8% 23.7% 27.7%
Notes: T ′(θ¯) denotes optimal top tax rate derived
from (F.1). The range of values for d lnL(θ¯)
d ln y(θ¯)
is im-
puted from the observed ranges reported in Fig-
ure 1.
In all cases considered the main result presented in Section 6 is robust: Optimal tax rates are
signiﬁcantly lower than in the case without a scale-of-operations effect.
G F I RM S I ZE TAXAT ION : A NUMER ICAL I L LUSTRAT ION
As emphasized in Section 4.3, the marginal product of labor at the optimum is typically
not equalized across ﬁrms. This feature is necessary for incentive provision and, in our
decentralization, translates into nonzero marginal taxes on ﬁrm size (see equation (20)). In this
section, we characterize optimal taxes on ﬁrm size in a calibrated example. Unlike in the body
of the paper where we focused on taxation at the top, here we compute ﬁrm size taxes over the
entire talent distribution (this allows us to study progressivity as well).
Table 6: Optimal Marginal Tax on Firm Size T ′L(wL(θ)).
Firm Size Percentile
ξ L¯/(θ¯n¯) 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th
0.5 2.9 2.12% 2.26% 2.34% 2.34% 2.21%
0.5 3.43 2.19% 2.33% 2.39% 2.38% 2.23%
0.7 2.9 1.68% 1.81% 1.88% 1.90% 1.84%
Notes: Firm size distortions T ′L(wL(θ)) deﬁned from equation (20).
We focus on US data and take the values for the parameters a, ε, σ, and γ from Table 2. In
addition, computing ﬁrm size taxes over the entire distribution of skills requires the calibration
of three additional objects: the distribution of talent, the production share parameter β, and
the social welfare function. We assume that the talent distribution is Pareto-Lognormal51 with
θ ∼ PlN(ζ, ι2, a), and following Mankiw et al. (2009), we set ζ = 2.76 and ι = 0.56. To calibrate β,
we use the deﬁnition of κ which implies:
κ(θ¯) =
yL(θ¯)L(θ¯)
y(θ¯)
=
1
1 + β1−β
(
L(θ¯)
θ¯n(θ¯)
)−ρ . (G.1)
51That is, θ d=θ1θ2, where θ1 ∼ LN(ζ, ι2) and θ2 ∼ P (a).
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We proxy the ratio L(θ¯)/(θn(θ¯)) with the number of production workers per non-production
workers in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Taking an average across all
industries we ﬁnd a value of 2.9 for 2011 and 3.43 for the entire sample. For robustness
purposes we use both values. Combining the latter with our calibration of κ¯ = 0.93, (G.1)
implies β ∈ [0.15, 0.17]. The social welfare function is parameterized as Ψ(U) = U ξ. We set ξ = 0.5
as a benchmark, and consider the effect of increasing ξ as well. Finally, government expenses
are set to G = 0.
Table 6, reports optimal marginal ﬁrm size taxes across ﬁrm size percentiles. Two facts
stand out. First, computed ﬁrm distortions are positive and economically signiﬁcant. For the
median ﬁrm, for example, these distortions raise the marginal labor cost by 2.26 percent above
the wage rate in the baseline speciﬁcation. Second, the marginal tax on labor use decreases
slightly at the top, and asymptotes at around 2 percent across all speciﬁcations.
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